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R&D Investments, Information and Strategy 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper argues that firms can best realize the value of their investments in R&D by exploiting the associated 
information asymmetries. Attention is directed away from the physical results of R&D and towards the firm’s 
ability, more generally, to earn rents from the private information emanating from its R&D. Four strategies may 
be used to exploit the information asymmetries from R&D: (1) publish the details of the innovation in return 
for legal protection; (2) keep the information inside the firm; (3) make the information selectively, informally 
available to others; and (4) disseminate the information as widely and rapidly as possible. To implement these 
strategies, resources may be allocated both to the commercial development of new technologies, and/or to 
related market opportunities (investing in other companies, assets and technologies). This perspective should 
yield new insights to managers in designing strategies (and counter-strategies) to position themselves not only at 
the technological edge, but more fundamentally, at the ‘information edge’. 
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R&D Investments, Information and Strategy  
 
 
1 Introduction 
How can firms best realize the value of their investments in research and development? In this paper, it is 
suggested that the answer lies not only in their ability to develop new products and processes per se, but more 
fundamentally, in their ability to exploit strategically the associated information asymmetries. Information 
asymmetries are defined, in this context, as arising due to differentials in the kinds of information emanating 
from the firm’s various R&D activities, where the information generated is initially private to that firm – and 
hence not available to others.1  
Firms can earn rents from the information asymmetries arising from investments in R&D by the use 
of four basic, and partially overlapping, strategies: (1) publish the details of the innovation in return for legal 
protection (patents, copyrights, and the like), (2) keep the information inside the firm (secrecy, tacit and firm-
specific knowledge), (3) make the information selectively available to others on an informal basis, and (4) widely 
disseminate the information, making it freely accessible to all comers. These strategies may be combined, 
developed and changed.  
To implement these strategies, resources may be allocated in two ways. First, firms may use private 
R&D information to develop new products and processes. This might take the form of internal research, a joint 
venture, or a plan to come ‘second on the market’. Alternatively, firms can allocate resources to related market 
opportunities by investing in other companies, assets and technologies. The use of private R&D information, 
for example, could be critical to the direct purchase of another, undervalued innovative firm with a 
complimentary research programme.  
The information asymmetries emanating from investments in R&D can generate rents in numerous 
ways. These include launching a breakthrough technology, introducing marginal variations on existing products, 
utilizing one’s own expertise to evaluate the research  results of others, trading knowledge to gain access to a 
technology network, signalling an interest in a potential R&D co -operation, or ‘marking off’ particular product 
markets as reserved for one’s own future use. Every strategy is vulnerable to counter-strategies. Patents can be 
infringed, secrets can be broken, information-sharing can be abused. Thus the innovator’s choice of strategy is 
contingent on the counter-strategies pursued by other market participants: competitors, specialists in 
complementary technologies, suppliers, distributors, and users. It is the outcome of this dynamic, complex 
interaction that determines the ultimate value of R&D investments, along with who benefits.  
While there is an enormous literature on R&D incentives, and the implications of asymmetric 
information for competitive strategy, no-one, to my knowledge, has utilized asymmetric information in the 
manner described here to explore how firms can profit from their investments in R&D. It is the purpose of this 
paper to suggest the preliminary outlines for such a framework for analysis. It can help to explain why some new 
information is diffused quickly, some quite slowly, and some not at all - and why many firms may find it to their 
                                                             
1 Asymmetric information can be further specified as follows: there are differences in the types of information 
held by the economic agents concerned; the information can be available, but when it is available it is unevenly 
distributed, and the differences in the information sets held by each agent are unobservable.  
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benefit deliberately to ‘give away’ research results. It can further our understanding of why firms, despite the 
costs and risks of innovation, continue to increase their investments in R&D. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevance of asymmetric information for the 
analysis of innovation and business strategy. Differences in the types of information emanating from R&D form 
the subject of Section 3. Following this, the four main strategies by which firms can exploit the information 
asymmetries arising from investments in R&D are set forth. Section 5 investigates how firms can earn rents both 
through developing new technologies, and exploiting related market opportunities. Section 6 expands the 
analysis is expanded to issues of strategy and counter-strategy, and Section 7 focuses on MNE organizational 
advantages. Section 8 presents the conclusion further implications for research.  
 
2 Theoretical Background 
Asymmetric information may arise both within firms (between headquarters and subsidiary, between different 
departments in the same division, between managers and employees, and so forth), and between them 
(between buyers and suppliers/distributors, and between competitors). This paper will largely be confined to 
the strategic implications of asymmetric information between competitors. The arguments are grounded, first 
and foremost, in the logic of the literature on business strategy and competitive advantage, but with a specific 
focus on investments in R&D.  
Asymmetric information is a key concept in game theory (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), agency 
theory (cf. Sappington, 1991), transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1985) and theories of property 
rights/corporate governance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In the economics of information/industrial 
organization literature, the relationship between innovation and asymmetric information has been explored, for 
example, in the analysis of optimal R&D investment strategies (McGahan, 1993), patent races (Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1982), and patent licensing (Beggs, 1992). These models, however, are difficult to apply to practical 
business decision-making. 
In the business strategy literature, R&D is viewed primarily as a means of generating competitive 
asymmetries between firms (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), but not specifically as a source of 
information asymmetries. Students of technological innovation have explored questions such as the sources of 
innovation, and how innovation contributes to growth and competitive advantage – though not in the context 
of information asymmetry. Asymmetric information, for its part, is seen as a cause of market failure that can 
enhance competitiveness (cf. Yao, 1988, Nayyar, 1990) – but without an explicit linkage to R&D.  
Rosenberg (1990) touched indirectly on this issue. Asking why firms engage in basic research, he 
contended that in many industries, firms can still benefit from investing in R&D even though the commercial 
gains might not be immediately forthcoming. Innovators at the technological edge cannot afford not  to invest in 
R&D, for unless they maintain a certain level of in-house expertise, they cannot remain market leaders. Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989) found that while R&D obviously leads to innovation, it also contributes to the firm’s 
ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from its environment. Even if a competitor should gain 
access to the innovator’s knowledge, it might not be able to exploit it. Only by performing its own R&D can a 
firm develop the requisite learning and ‘absorptive capacity.’ Macdonald (1998) has developed an explicit 
information perspective on innovation, emphasizing the key (but often unrecognized) role of informal 
information in R&D. But again, these scholars have not seen innovation specifically as a source of information 
asymmetries.  
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The arguments developed in this paper are novel in the following manners. First, attention is directed 
away from the physical results of R&D activities and towards the ability of the firm, more generally, to earn rents 
based on the information asymmetries arising from its investments in R&D. While there is a jointness between 
the physical results of R&D and the associated rents (making analytical separation of the two difficult), it is not 
inconceivable that an R&D programme, while producing no directly valuable commercial technology, might still 
yield private information enabling the firm to extract rents through exploiting a related market opportunity.  
Second, the generation of asymmetric information is seen in dynamic terms. The innovative firm 
creates new information which, at least at first, is not known to other market agents. But it is unlikely to remain 
private for long. Since information is intangible, and often easily replicable and transferable, any initial 
asymmetries may quickly be eroded. But since innovation is also dynamic, further asymmetries will continue to 
emerge, as other firms produce their own new, private information. 
Third, a distinction is drawn between private information, the physical results of R&D (i.e. the creation 
of new products and processes), and the sources of rents from R&D. The physical results of R&D may or may 
not have a commercial application, but will always yield private information. Some of this private information – 
either jointly with the physical results of R&D, or by itself – may contribute to a strategy by which the firm can 
extract rents. In some instances, the information must initially remain private (as, for example, in the case of 
speculation). In other instances, depending on the institutional context, rents may be augmented by the firm 
revealing all or a part of its private information. This would be true, say, of patenting – assuming a regime of 
strong and enforceable patent rights. 
Fourth, this perspective provides another explanation of how MNEs can use their organizat ional 
advantages to achieve competitive advantage. Locating subsidiaries in many different countries enables the MNE 
not only to exploit a range of subsidiary-specific advantages in R&D, but also to place information-gathering 
‘outposts’ around the world. The key organization task here is to plan the R&D effort so as to maximize the 
rents that may accrue from working across different countries.  
And finally, the investigation of the exploitation of asymmetric information leads to a better 
appreciation of firm ‘positioning’ strategies vis-à-vis their own – and their rivals’ – R&D efforts. 
 
3 Informational Aspects of R&D Investments 
In the economics and business literature dealing with the commercial development of new products and 
processes, it has long been realized that information is imperfectly appropriable. If firms cannot appropriate the 
rents from their investments in R&D, they will lack the incentive to invest in further research (Arrow, 1962, 
Nelson, 1959). The innovating firm provides a positive externality to other market participants in that due to the 
public good nature of information (and assuming zero transaction costs), its research results will become 
available to others at little or no extra cost, enabling them to ‘free ride’ on its benefits.  
Nevertheless, empirical studies of the patent system revealed that there could be considerable industry 
and other differences in this regard. Mansfield and his colleagues (1981, 1986) determined that patents raise 
imitation costs and times only marginally for most industrial sectors – with the notable exception of chemicals 
and, in particular, pharmaceuticals. In a study measuring the speed at which new technological information ‘leaks 
out’ to other firms, Mansfield (1985) ascertained that in some cases, the decision to develop a new technology 
was known to rivals within six months; in other cases, it took longer than eighteen months. Information about 
new products tended to leak out more rapidly than that concerning new processes.  
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In the business strategy literature, it has also been recognized that new knowledge may be quickly – and 
often involuntarily – disseminated (cf. Zander, 1991). Studies of firm strategies of appropriability (Levin et al., 
1987, Bertin and Wyatt, 1988, Davis, 1988) underlined the general lack of effectiveness of the different methods, 
which can include patents, secrecy, lead time/learning curve, trademarks, licensing, and the like. Like Mansfield, 
they found striking industry variations.  
The economics and business literature dealing with firm use of private R&D information to exploit 
related market opportunities probably also has its thematic beginnings in  the debate over appropriability and the 
desirability of a patent system. What are, in welfare economic terms, the pecuniary effects of access to superior 
R&D information (‘wealth redistributions due to price revaluations’), were first highlighted by Hirschleifer 
(1971). Hirschleifer, while recognizing the importance of the problem of appropriability, noted that these 
possible pecuniary effects – which could be realized due to the innovator’s foreknowledge of market 
opportunities – represented an important force operating in the opposite direction.  
To illustrate his point, Hirschleifer suggested that when Eli Whitney patented the cotton gin in 1794, 
he devoted much effort to trying to protect his patent and prosecute infringements, largely to no avail. Yet there 
were other routes to profit for Whitney. The wider adoption of the cotton gin clearly had implications for factors 
such as the price of cotton, the value of cotton-bearing land, the prospects of businesses engaged in cotton 
warehousing and shipping, the site values of key points along the transportation routes, and developments in 
competing industries like wool and complementary ones like textiles and machinery. Thus huge speculative gains 
were potentially available to anyone with foreknowledge of the coming of the cotton gin.  
Few scholars have developed Hirschleifer’s insights, or elaborated them in terms of the possible rents 
that might accrue even to firms whose immediate commercial research is otherwise a failure. Rosenberg (1990), 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989), and Macdonald, as noted in Section 2, explored some of the relevant issues in this 
respect, but did not explicitly analyze R&D investments as a source of information asymmetries. 
The classic work on strategy and counter-strategy as regards profiting from investments in R&D is 
Teece (1986). He pointed out that innovators often fail to win from investments in innovation, while 
customers, imitators, suppliers and other market participants benefit. Some industries could be characterized by 
a ‘tight’ appropriability regime, where patents and related methods effectively prevented imitation. But in a weak 
appropriability regime, firms with superior complementary assets often profited most. Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988) showed that being first on the market could carry first mover advantages beyond patent 
protection (learning curve advantages, the preemption of scarce assets, buyer uncertainty as to quality, and buyer 
switching costs). Such analyses are key to the arguments developed below on how firm s can ‘position’ 
themselves to take advantage of R&D opportunities. Firms with superior complementary assets clearly also have 
private information relating to these assets.  
How can firms exploit the information asymmetries arising from their R&D investments? Arguably, 
four basic strategies may be used. 
 
4 Exploiting R&D Information Asymmetries: Four Strategies 
4.1 Publication in Return for Legal Protection 
With this strategy, the firm recognizes that information may well ‘leak out’ to rival firms, and deci des to publish 
it, retaining proprietary control through legal means. Methods include patents, copyrights, design patents, and 
semiconductor chip protection (cf. Besen and Raskind, 1991). Depending on the method chosen, the type and 
degree of protection may vary.  
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A patent, for example, gives the inventor the legal right to exclude others from manufacturing and 
selling its new product or process for a given period of time (normally twenty years). In return, the inventor 
discloses the details of the new tech nology, so that others may learn from it and build on it. To be patentable, an 
invention must satisfy three criteria: novelty, non-obviousness, and industrial applicability. Patents are used in all 
industries, but are considered particularly important for inventions in pharmaceuticals, speciality chemicals, and 
for certain mechanically simple inventions which cannot be protected otherwise. A copyright, by contrast, gives 
the author the exclusive privilege of publishing and selling one particular work. It is mainly used in fields like 
book publishing, movies, popular music and computer software. 
Intellectual property rights can also be used as the juridical basis for contractual agreements, such as 
patent licenses, cross-licenses, buyer-supplier contracts, and distribution agreements. A firm may decide, say, that 
it does not wish to manufacture its new product, but to earn royalties from it through licensing. Licenses can, if 
desired, be restricted to a single company, and/or particular geographical areas. Contracts based on intellectual 
property rights have the benefit that they clearly specify the legal obligations of the different parties, and what 
legal recourse is available in the event of contractual non-performance.  
 
4.2 Keeping the Information Inside the Firm 
Second, a firm might choose not to disclose information, but try to keep it inside the firm through secrecy, tacit 
and firm -specific knowledge. According to studies, secrecy is often used to protect process inventions, where 
would -be competitors ca n be barred from entering plant premises, and for inventions that resist reverse 
engineering. A classic case is Coca Cola, preserved as a trade secret for a hundred years until – quite recently – 
disclosed over the Internet. The disadvantage of secrecy is that if other firms discover the secret by legal means, 
they cannot be prevented from copying it.  
An example of the competitive advantages that may be derived from tacit knowledge is the invention 
by Fläkt, a Swedish multinational, of a new drying system (the FC-dryer) for the pulp and paper industry 
(Zander and Zander, 1994). Very little information about the manufacturing activities was conveyed by 
blueprints, and manufacturing personnel had to undergo on-the-job training to learn their jobs. The 
manufacturing and materials technologies were too complex for any one or even a few employees to take to a 
competitor, and the technology was not imitated. 
One cost firms may experience in using this second strategy is the high mobility of people, for when 
employees leave, they take their special skills and knowledge with them. Employment contracts often contain 
provisions prohibiting employees from using internally developed know-how in their new job. But such 
contracts may be difficult to enforce particularly when employees move abroad. Valued employees are also not 
easy to replace. Such costs are ceteris paribus  not incurred for information publically disclosed in a patent or a 
copyright. 
 
4.3 Make the Information Selectively Available on an Informal Basis  
Informal knowledge exchange can be extremely valuable to innovating firms. Employees often need 
information in connection with their work that is very specialized and not published anywhere. They can either 
try to develop it themselves, or obtain it from an expert in another firm. In-house development can be very 
expensive, and it may make sense just to pick up the phone and ask someone.  
A computer engineer reported, for example, that if he ran into a problem in developing a new software 
system, instead of trying (as in the past) to solve it himself, or consult a colleague, he would describe it on the 
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Internet. Within a day or so, someone usually contacted him with the answer, referring to a written source, or 
internal know-how. Later, he could return the favour. Often, the knowledge exchanged was proprietary. 
Characteristically, in this strategy, rents may accrue as a result of the controlled – and reciprocal – nature of 
information sharing.  
Informal knowledge sharing can also be systematized, as Von Hippel and Schrader (1996) 
demonstrated in their study of the oil scout trading mechanism. All oil exploration firms face the problem that 
existing geological data and expertise is critical in the evaluation of a given area’s potential for oil production. But 
some of this data is proprietary, held by rival oil exploration firms. To solve this problem, the industry has 
established groups of specialists called ‘oil scouts’. These scouts are individually employed by their respective oil 
exploration firms. But if a scout’s employer requires proprietary information possessed by a rival firm, she can 
arrange to meet her counterpart at that firm and propose a trade. 
 
4.4 Rapid Dissemination by Making the Information Freely Available to All  
Comers 
Finally, the firm may choose openly to diffuse the private information produced in its R&D laboratories, actively 
revealing it to other market participants, accelerating market penetration. Rapid dissemination may be 
implemented, say, by initially selling the new product at or below cost, or by adopting a liberal licensing policy 
granting the rights to one’s new technology to virtually all comers. Thus Computer Associates gave away its 
Simply Money software on the expectation that favourable word-of-mouth would outweigh the expense of 
making the diskettes; further, the firm hoped that customers could later be persuaded to buy upgrades and 
related programmes. Nintendo distributed its game consoles to customers at or below cost, to boost sales of its 
software. 2 Such a strategy is particularly appropriate for industries characterized by network externalities, where 
the value of a good to each consumer increases, the more other consumers use the same or compatible products 
(cf. Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
The advantages of this dissemination strategy include not only the (short-term) benefits of seeing the 
technology become more widely known and used, but also the longer-term opportunity to earn rents by driving 
would -be rivals from the market once buyers have been ‘locked in’. Some firms use this strategy to influence the 
formulation of international standards, which can later form an important future barrier to entry, as rivals must 
incur extra costs in adapting their production systems to the requirements of the standard. For technologies 
where buyer switching costs are high, the innovator can also gradually raise its price. The disadvantage is that 
once the information is released onto the market, the innovator may lose ‘control’ over what happens to it.  
 
4.5 Combinations and Permutations 
These four strategies can be combined in various ways. Thus patent licensing may be used in strategies (1) and 
(4). But the purpose and function is different. In strategy (1), the license serves mainly, together with the patent, 
as a barrier to entry. In strategy (4), it serves mainly to promote rapid dissemination. A firm might also seek to 
keep its process technology secret, but be indif ferent as to how much information about its product technology 
leaked out to other firms.  
                                                             
2 And Rupert Murdoch, instead of denigrating the Indian upstarts who stole the signal from his News 
Corporation's Star TV satellite and resold the programmes to people over cable TV, reportedly characterized 
them as ‘splendid entrepreneurs’ who broadened Star’s potential market and allowed Murdoch to raise his 
advertising rates (Gross et al., 1995). 
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5 Use of R&D-Generated Private Information to Earn Rents 
A major advantage of analyzing R&D investments as a source of information asymmetries – as opposed to 
innovative capabilities – is that it considerably broadens the range of strategic acts available to managers, as will 
be explored below. 
 
5.1 Use of Private Information in the Commercial Development of New  
Technologies 
Firms can use the private information generated from their R&D investments to earn rents from the commercial 
development of new technologies by several means, including launching an independent research effort, building 
a research collaboration, coming second on the market, and strategic signalli ng. Critical to shaping firm choices in 
this regard is the nature of the information concerned. As Winter (1987) pointed out, some types of knowledge 
may have more of a ‘public good’ character than others (he distinguished between new knowledge that was 
largely articulable, observable in use, simple and independent, and that which was largely tacit, not observable in 
use, complex and an element of a system).  
Product patents are considered an effective strategy of appropriability in the pharmaceutical industry, for 
example, because while the costs and risks of developing a new drug are extremely high, once the drug is on the 
market, it is normally relatively cheap and easy to produce. Thus the information cannot easily be kept secret. 
(Process technology, by contrast, is often kept secret in this industry). A further advantage is that it can be clearly 
specified what the molecular construction of new drug consists of, and how it fulfils the criteria of patentability, 
which can be harder to do for inventions in other industries (Levin et al., 1987). 
In choosing this approach, the firm must decide, in effect, that the benefits of patent protection justify 
the release of valuable proprietary knowledge. The successful exploitation of this strategy is highly dependent on 
the efficacy of the legal system to function as it should. Firms operating internationally must secure intellectual 
property rights protection in every country in which they plan to market the good. The costs of implementation 
(including both application and enforcement) are substantial.  
If the firm decides not to patent, it might attempt to protect the invention as a trade secret until the 
time comes to launch it commercially. Then, riding the waves of lead -time and learning curve, the firm can 
prevent imitation by maintaining its head start, based on technological superiority. The risks of implementing 
this strategy are, clearly, that competitors might introduce their own version of the product or service first – or 
that once the innovator’s own goods are on the market, competitors will catch up. As Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988) recognized, learning curve advantages often have little value unless they are kept proprietary.  
Co-operative product development strategies enable the exchange of valuable information, both 
formally and informally. Advantages include sharing costs and risks, learning synergies, accelerated speed to 
market, low-cost entry into new industries and industry segments, and an enhanced ability to meet customer 
demands for integrated systems. Disadvantages include the possibility of misunderstandings, disputes and 
opportunistic behaviour. It may be difficult, for one thing, to find the right partner (due to the problem of 
adverse selection); the partner may not have the expected level of knowledge or skills; or the partner may abuse 
its access to proprietary knowledge. These points are well known and need not be further elaborated here, 
beyond the comment that the costs of co -operation will negatively affect the size of the potential associated 
rents.   
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Firms may also, through liberal patent licensing policies, expand the worldwide use of their innovation 
by rapidly disseminating it. Pilkington’s development of a new process for making plate glass transformed the 
industry, enabling it to become the largest glass manufacturer in the world. Because the development costs had 
been so high, Pilkington licensed the process to its competitors. This strategy not only generated substantial 
royalty income, it also helped to make the new process the industry standard, and assured the continuation of 
Pilkington’s technological leadership for decades.  
An alternative approach is to come second on the market. A case in point, as described by Teece (1986), 
concerns the CT scanner, invented and originally marketed by the British firm EMI. But it was General Electric, 
thanks to its strong complementary assets (particularly its superior marketing and distribution networks) that 
eventually dominated this market. But (to use the logic of this paper), it was not just possessing these assets 
that helped GE to win. Drawing on the private information from its R&D labs, GE was able not only to 
evaluate EMI’s capabilities, but also to develop its rival scanner. Combining this information with a superior 
understan ding about how to succeed on the critical American market, it could draw off the lion’s share of the 
profits.  
Finally, through publicizing their investments in R&D, firms can ‘signal’ their intentions to 
competitors and users alike. In an example described by Kahaner (1996), during the 1970s and early 1980s, 3M 
dominated the worldwide videotape business. Japanese tape makers (Fuji, Sony, TDK, and Maxell) realized that 
consumers wanted longer-recording tapes. The 3M tapes could not meet this demand, because the plastic base 
film was too thick. No existing producer seemed interested in introducing next -generation technology for 
thinning the films. In 1980 the Japanese film producer Toray bought an expensive coating machine, signalling to 
the tape makers that it was initiating research to produce thinner tape. The tape makers joined the filmmakers to 
develop strong, long-duration tapes with a high quality image. Eventually, the Japanese firms marketed the 
longer-playing tape, apparently taking 3M by surprise. 
Signals are an indication of strategic intent. They can forestall the actions of competitors or create 
uncertainty that may limit the ability to respond. By taking out a patent, for example, a firm lets other market 
players know that it considers that parti cular area important. This message can be sent regardless of whether or 
not the patented invention is developed commercially. Signals can affect customer expectations as well. Software 
companies sometimes announce the introduction of new systems that are years away from completion. 
According to the companies, announcements of this sort help users to plan. But competitors complain that 
preannouncements lead customers to wait for the new programme instead of buying their own products which 
may, in fact, be further along in the development process (D’Aveni, 1995, Kahaner, 1996). 
 
5.2 Private Information and Related Market Opportunities  
Private information from R&D can be exploited in several manners to earn rents in related markets: through 
mergers and co -operative agreements, speculation, using private information to derive the benefits of technology 
diffusion, and (again) signalling.  
First, firms may use the information asymmetries generated by their R&D investments to evaluate 
potential take-over prospects. In the case of the CT scanner, as described above, GE used its private information 
not only directly, in the innovation process, but also to evaluate the skills and resources of the other scanner 
manufacturers on the market – some of which it eventually took over. 
One of the more interesting results from analyses of the R&D consequences of merger activities is that 
acquiring firms, contrary to what might otherwise be thought, are either more sophisticated in terms of R&D, or 
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have R&D programmes equivalent to those of the target firms (Hall, 1987). There are few instances of firms 
‘substituting’ a lack of internal R&D through merging with firms with heavy R&D commitments. One could 
claim that it takes sophisticated R&D programmes to develop the private inform ation necessary to first identify 
potential target firms, and then after takeover to use the potential R&D synergies to obtain competitive 
advantages. 
A prime example of the use of private information through takeover activity concerns the relationship 
between the established pharmaceutical FIRMs and new biotechnology enterprises (NBEs). The former, with 
their private information as to the costs of commercial development and marketing, allowed the one thousand 
or so NBEs to attempt to develop biotechnology products. The large pharmaceutical firms developed an 
expertise in biotech, but did not specialize in it, as did the NBEs. Thus while all large pharmaceuticals conducted 
biotechnology research, as of 1994 of the twenty-two biotech medical products approved for sale in the United 
States, only one was the product of a large pharmaceutical incumbent (Eli Lilly). Of the eight products under 
license, however, six were licensed to pharmaceutical incumbents. Of the twelve NBEs with the twenty-two 
approved products , five NBEs had been wholly or partially acquired by pharmaceutical incumbents. These five 
firms accounted for 13 (60 percent) of the 22 approved products (Zucker and Darby, 1996). 
Alliances, mergers, and cooperative agreements permeate the biotechnology industry. Many of these 
forms of collaboration can be said to function as ‘real options’. (Kogut, 1991, Burgers, Hill and Kim, 1993). By 
buying into several collaborations of this type, both NBEs and the pharmaceutical incumbents can create a 
portfolio of alliances, simultaneously diversifying their risks, increasing learning, and augmenting their sources of 
private information for future strategic use. 
Private information may also be used for more speculative purposes. To return to Hirschleifer’s (1971) 
story of Eli Whitney: the argument that Whitney could putatively have earned rents by investing in assets made 
more valuable by his cotton gin is intriguing. Yet such speculation also carries considerable risks, and the 
example can be criticized as unrealistic. Most firms have neither the time nor the resources to ‘position’ 
themselves to realize such benefits. There are several pitfalls here: 
First, in many instances, the scope of effort to utilize private information for gain on related markets is 
too great. Such would probably have been the case with Eli Whitney. Yet too much can be made of this 
problem. For example, private information of one’s own R&D effort could enable the innovator simply to 
purchase equities in the firms controlling these assets.  
Second, other actors can react quickly to deprive a firm of the chance to earn rents. The degree to which 
private information remains private after the firm’s first move into the market can be questionable. Put in the Eli 
Whitney context: could Whitney really have used his private information given the scope of his task and the fact 
that his related investment in, say, cotton plantations, might have been observable to others? Here, the context 
in which the private information is put has much to do with its success. There is considerable evidence that 
equity share prices often rapidly rise or fall after a market leader has ‘moved’ to take advantage of private 
information. 
Then too, as Rosenberg (1995) has pointed out, it can be extremely difficult to anticipate the future 
applications of successful innovations, not least because most technologies come into the world in a very 
primitive condition. The first computer, the ENIAC, was huge and unreliable; this computer obviously had a 
limited market. But as the future would show, the demand for computers skyrocketed once they had been made 
smaller, cheaper, and more reliable. The point here is not that a firm should, necessarily, use its information to 
speculate, only that it should be aware of its option to do so. 
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Firms might, in other circumstances, find it in their interests actually to pay the manufacturers of 
complementary products to enter the market for their own goods. 3DO, for example, developed both the 
hardware and the software technology for a new generation of video games. To use the software, customers had 
to have the hardware. So 3DO gave away the licenses to produce the hardware technology, thereby inducing 
hardware manufacturers like Panasonic (Matsushita), Goldstar, Sanyo and Toshiba to enter this business. To 
create further momentum, it was best that these manufacturers sold the hardware below cost. Since they had no 
particular reason to do so on their own, 3DO additionally offered them 2 shares of 3DO stock for each machine 
sold (Brandenberger and Nalebuff, 1995).  
A further example of the use of private information to exploit opportunities in related markets lies in 
the strategy of credible signalling. In industries characterized by multiple product firms, such signalling by an 
incumbent can be useful to thwart entrants. (Here, the incumbent threatens the prospective entrant by signalling 
that she could enter that firm’s own main product markets, should the entrant insist on a debilitating foray into 
the incumbent’s markets). Alternatively, a firm might signal the existence of private information as the basis for 
entering a joint venture with a firm further ahead in the field or with complementary expertise. 
A firm might also build up its patent portfolio as a ‘bargaining chip’ in negotiating a cross-licensing 
agreement, giving it vitally important access to another firm’s patented inventions in related areas. For if an 
innovator has little of value to trade, others will have no reason to deal (Grindley & Teece, 1997). 3DO’s strategy 
of subsid ising hardware manufacturers to produce hardware for its software can also, in this regard, be described 
as a form of signalling. The firm indicated to others that it planned to market this software widely, and that it 
was willing to lose money on the hardware portion of the business until its earnings could later be boosted by 
the sales of software. 
 
6 Implications for Strategy 
In making choices, the innovator must not only be flexible, adapting to changing technological and market 
conditions, but also take into account the counter-strategies available to competitors. Intellectual property rights, 
for example, have been described as a means of protecting private information. Yet because the information is 
published, rivals can read the patent document and use the revealed information to create their own, marginally 
different versions – or even infringe the patent. 
That patents are systematically registered opens up a wealth of additional opportunities for firms 
seeking access to information. A statistical study of the patents granted in one’s field of research can highlight 
which other firms and individuals are doing the leading work, in which countries. The individual patent 
document specifies whether the invention is the product of a joint research effort, whether it has been licensed 
out, and on which previous patents it is based. But patent -holders – for their part – are not without counter-
strategies in this regard. Some, aware that competitors will scan the patent data for information about what they 
are  doing, may seek to ‘hide’ their position: large multinationals can assign patent rights to a subsidiary; small 
firms can list the name of the owner as the assignee, not the company. In the case of joint ventures, the patent 
can be assigned to either partner.  
Firms can keep rivals guessing as to their future plans. Intel has multiple capabilities, with strengths in 
microprocessors, other chips, flash memories, PCs and supercomputers. But it has not entered all of these 
markets. Not wishing to compete with its customers, for example, Intel has not begun to manufacture personal 
computers - even though it could. As a result, competitors can never be sure that Intel will not enter a given 
market in the future. Further, by maintaining a massive R&D presence, and signalling that it has plans for new 
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technological breakthroughs in chip technology throughout the 1990s, it encourages its customers to wait for its 
next chip rather than adopt those of its rivals (D’Aveni, 1995). 
A related example concerns an announcement made by Glaxo, the leading pharmaceutical manufacturer 
in the areas of asthma relief products, that it was marketing a breakthrough product: a bronchodilator that also 
had an anti-inflammatory component. Glaxo’s Swedish competitor, Astra, was concerned that this 
announcement would preempt its plans to come out with a similar product, which was not as far along. But 
when Astra’s researchers studied Glaxo’s clinical tests, they learned that the anti-inflammatory effect did not 
work on humans, but only on animals. Astra used this finding to calm industry excitement, and to give itself 
time for its own clinical trials and experiments. It received, in the bargain, data from Glaxo’s clinical trials that 
they could use in their own research (Kahaner, 1996). 
A n  innovating firm that lacks complete information about demand conditions can, by delaying 
product -specific investments, win time to obtain better information (McGahan, 1993). Waiting, however, may 
make it vulnerable to imitation. One solution is to introduce  a prototype to test market demand. If demand 
proves lower than expected, the innovator can perhaps withdraw from the market; if demand proves higher, it 
can keep this information secret, and make the capital investment. In this way, first movers can deter would-be 
imitators without preemptive investment. 3 Alternatively, it can attempt to realize pecuniary gains from the 
investments in R&D by selling the information to another firm on the market.  
A final method is to create buyer-switching costs. To counter this strategy, rivals can offer free samples 
or redesign their products to reduce customers’ conversion costs.  Thus computer software makers can include 
free samples on the hard disc drives of new computers, or package them with personal computers or peripherals. 
 
7 MNE Organizational Advantages 
Information asymmetry has been important to the analysis of the management of information flows in the 
multinational enterprise (cf. Hennart, 1991). Casson (1982), for example, argued that by integrating vertically, the 
MNE could reduce information asymmetry as regards the quality of its goods produced throughout the supply 
chain. Yet his focus is on market imperfections due to the problem of quality assurance, not R&D. 4 With regard 
to R&D, economic theories of the MNE have emphasized the importance of internalizing research results, due 
to imperfections in the market for knowledge (cf. Buckley & Casson, 1976). The problem of appropriability has 
been specifically used as an explanation for the growth of the MNE by Magee (1977). Again, these accounts do 
not discuss the information asymmetries  arising from R&D. 
Yet the MNE’s organizational structure and ‘deep pockets’ can arguably provide a powerful advantage 
in exploiting the private information generated in its R&D programmes. In recent years, multinational 
                                                             
3 For example, Phillips formed an alliance with Sony to establish a standard for CDs. But this sharing of key 
information also made Sony the best equipped competitor to follow Phillips onto the American market. Phillips 
decided not to make a large, product -specific investment in the American market, but initially to import CDs 
from Europe to test market acceptance. While the initial press reviews of the sound quality of the new CDs had 
been mixed, Phillips knew, from its private tests, that demand was strong . Keeping this information to itself, 
Phillips committed capital to building a U.S. facility for pressing compact discs. Once on the market, the CDs 
were extremely popular, and demand soared. As a result of this strategy, Phillips could use its first-mover 
position to dominate Sony and the other later entrants. On the other hand, had the initial tests shown that the 
market was not acceptable, Philips could quietly have withdrawn (McGahan, 1992).  
 
4 Suppliers, he argued, have an advantage over buyers (MNEs) in checking the quality of their products, since the 
information is created as a joint product of the supplier’s production process. By integrating backwards into 
production, the MNE can gain access to this information directly. 
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enterprises have decentralized a rising portion of their R&D (OECD, 1998, Nobel and Birkinshaw, 1998). 
Overseas laboratories can play a number of roles (Eteman and Dulude, 1986, Pearce, 1997), from adapting 
products developed elsewhere in the MNE to local market needs to specializing in advanced scientific work. Such 
subsidiaries can contribute in various ways to the MNE’s ability to use information. For example, subsidiaries 
can tap into foreign sources of knowledge through their access to the local technological infrastructure, including 
local suppliers, universities and other research institutions.  
MNEs can also take advantage of their subsidiary network to establish scanning units worldwide to 
supply market intelligence and other information relevant to the product development effort, making a 
continuous flow of technical information available to the R&D centre, either via the Internet or in the form of 
meetings among the personnel of the different units. Many Japanese electronics firms, for example, have 
retained their development capab ilities at home while dispersing numerous small scanning units (normally 
consisting of a few product designers) in their major foreign markets (Chiesa & Manzini, 1996). Other 
subsidiaries, called ‘integrated laboratories’, may provide basic or applied research inputs into a larger innovation 
programme, co -operating with laboratories in other countries and the parent laboratory.  
An important issue concerns how the MNE can plan its international R&D efforts, and co-ordinate the 
resulting information flows, so as to maximize the rents that can accrue from working across countries - and so 
that the associated rents are not dissipated. The organization of multinational R&D projects involving several 
laboratories worldwide requires sophisticated co -ordination at all phases of the development process. Prior to 
the initial project definition phase, market intelligence flows from the different units to the central unit, which 
decides which projects to implement, and how the R&D is to be divided among the different units. During the 
development phase, information is continuously exchanged, helping the individual labs to develop their 
contribution to the overall project. Finally, the different subsidiaries can contribute in their own ways to the 
product’s market introduction.  
Similarly, the use of complementary assets to win over competitors by coming second on the market, 
as described earlier, requires formidable co -ordination skills, both in dealing with the MNE’s different partners 
(suppliers, distributors, and so fo rth), and in grasping the relevant issues in many different countries. Clearly, 
appropriating rents from R&D carried out in foreign countries is a much larger and more complex endeavour 
than that confronted by Eli Whitney with his cotton gin.  
 
8 Discussion and Conclusions 
Private R&D information, it has been argued, can be used either in new product development, or in relation to 
other market opportunities. It can serve to facilitate an independent research effort, or it can be shared. It can 
inform investments in complementary technologies, to evaluate take-over prospects, to help the firm come 
second on the market, to signal strategic intent, or even to send false signals.  
This focus on the potential rents arising from private R&D information is closely reflected in the desire, 
as expressed by many R&D managers, to use R&D more aggressively to enhance competitiveness.5 Firms 
increasingly use gatekeepers and ‘technology trackers’ to keep abreast of the information adva nces occurring 
around them. ABB has developed a sophisticated process for assessing and improving its technological position 
– Business Technology Evaluation – to ensure that it makes the right investments in R&D (Stillman, 1997). 
                                                             
5 According to the results of a 1995/96 Arthur D. Little survey of leading European Chief Technology 
Officers, R&D is being regarded more and more as a ‘competitive weapon’, intimately linked to business 
strategy (Sommerlatte, 1997). 
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This paper indicates one way in which MNEs might usefully envision the information emanating from 
their R&D activities as a source of competitive advantage.  
Both the type of information, and the organizational capabilities of the firm concerned, are important 
in this regard. Clearly, some types of information can more easily be patented or kept secret than others, and 
some can be more easily exchanged (or disseminated). Organizational capabilities affect the firm’s ability to 
implement the chosen strategy. While a small firm might  lack the resources develop its invention commercially, it 
can license the rights to another firm, or to set itself up as a partner in a joint venture. A large multinational with 
many foreign subsidiaries might arguably be more effective than a small one in using its global marketing and 
distribution networks to disseminate its information as quickly as possible. But may be less able to recognize the 
value of the key information asymmetries generated in its decentralized labs.  
Growing time pressures (shrinking product life cycles, the increased importance of speed to market) 
arguably raise both the tempo of innovation and, following the lines of argument in this paper, the incidence of 
the information asymmetries arising from investments in R&D. But they also shorten the ‘life’ of the 
asymmetries concerned, reducing the time that managers have at their disposal to decide what to do, and 
increasing the rate at which rivals will generate their own information asymmetries.  
Each of the firm choices described in this paper involves its own set of costs and benefits. The costs of 
securing strong intellectual property rights protection, for example, may well exceed the benefits, if the product 
has a short life span. The costs of maintaining secrecy may be too great if the technology, by its nature, 
unexpectedly proves susceptible to reverse engineering. The costs of information gathering and verification as to 
the quality of the R&D programme of a potential take -over candidate might also prove prohibitively high.  
Moreover, the fact that a firm has private R&D information may have a value in itself, above and 
beyond any specific strategic use. Investor knowledge that the firm has large reserves of potentially commercially 
valuable private information, for example, is often reflected in the pricing of traded shares. It may also make it 
easier to negotiate terms for receiving a bank loan, or for entry into a joint venture.  
An important theoretical issue concerns the nature of the rents derived from the generation of private 
R&D information. The concept of ‘information rents,’ in the economics literature, has been mainly applied to 
the analysis of incentive contracts and principal-agent relationships (cf. Aoki, Gustafsson and Williamson, eds. 
(1990). In this paper, rents from investments in R&D are seen in somewhat different terms: as the returns in 
excess of the firm’s opportunity costs accruing to it through its exploitation of private R&D information. In 
principal-agent theory, information rents are used in an ex ante contractual context.  
That a high-tech firm has private information, unavailable to its competitors, which can be put to 
earning rents, is analogous to the agent in a principal-agent contract who can use its unobserved private 
information to earn rents. Yet in the logic of principal-agent theory, the contractual agent may only exceptionally 
reveal the private information on which its information rents are based. Doing so can lead to renegotiation of 
the contract, and an elimination of information rents, if not loss of the contract. In the perspective outlined here, 
the firm may seek to increase its ‘information rents’ by either keeping the information private or revealing it (or 
some combination), depending on the circumstances. This concept could profitably be the subject of future 
research. 
The approach outlined here could arguably also help managers to design an implement an active 
‘information policy’. When R&D investments are seen primarily as generators of private information – rather 
than new products an d processes alone – a new perspective on managing R&D to enhance competitiveness 
opens up. Conceivably, a firm could invest in R&D but engage in very little innovation as such – and yet still 
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turn a profit because of its successful use of information. Even if a given innovation fails, the information that 
went into producing it can be reapplied in other contexts.  
Investment in R&D, in this view, is also an investment in enhancing the ability of R&D personnel to 
think strategically about their work, and to find ways to use the information asymmetries thereby created to help 
their firm to win competitive advantage. Many of the ways in which this can be achieved – such as investments in 
complementary technologies and strategic signalling – are not the traditional province of the R&D department. 
But strategic decision-makers are unlikely to be aware of the full potential of the private information generated 
from investments in R&D. To the extent that firms fail to link opportunities from R&D-generated information 
asymmetries and management decision-making together, they may miss key rent-generating opportunities.  
Not all of this private information will have commercial value. Some means needs to be developed to 
distinguish between the relative importance of the different types of information generated from R&D. Also 
vital is the ability to evaluate the research results of other companies. All of these efforts need to be co -ordinated. 
The challenge is to design strategies (and counter-strategies) to enable managers to position their firms not just 
at the forefront of the technological edge - but also, more fundamentally, at the information edge.  
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